The dimension of the alliances has compelled experts to revise their preconceptions about the internationalization of companies and to include this strategy in their models as Uppsala model was forced to acknowledge. This article focuses on one of the alliances forged in Europe, very deviated from the practices of the majority because it was a company with exclusively European partners. It adopts the perspective of a peripheral country (Spain) in the global economy and from the special status of at least one of the partners in a monopoly. Finally, the article follows case study methodology, which aims to delve into the complexity of the processes and the phenomena at hand.
Introduction
Global strategic alliances are cooperative business arrangements between actual or potential competitor firms from several countries involving joint ventures for short-term contractual agreements around a particular problem (such as developing a new product). From a managerial perspective, the strategic objectives of these alliances are to enter into a foreign market, share the fixed costs and risks associated with the development of new products and processes, assist the inter-firm transfer of complementary skills, and establish technical standards (Hill, Jones, and Schilling 2016) . In a more general framework, firms find in international alliances the flexibility to respond to changing market conditions and effective paths for enlarging the scale of operations together with green field investment and mergers and acquisitions (M&As). The driving forces behind them embrace cost economizing in production and R&D, strengthening market presence, and accessing intangible assets.
During the last two decades of the 20 th century, the intensification of competition in open markets forced companies to adopt measures that would enable them to meet the new challenges in optimal conditions. One of the answers was to develop international strategic alliances, which became standard practice in the struggle for competitiveness, but with very different results. Sectoral and geographical components influenced the configuration of the alliances in such a way that in some industries, such as high-tech industries, they slightly outnumbered the amount of M&As and in the case of Europe, on which this article focuses, alliances established with the United States predominated over inter-European alliances.
The dimension of the phenomenon has forced experts to revise their preconceptions about the internationalization of companies and to include this strategy in their models; this was the case of the Uppsala model, initially very conditioned by its allegiance to Northern European industrial processes. Joining Dunning's (2001) OLI paradigm, it acknowledges the relevance of joint ventures and strategic alliances as ways of internationalizing (Johanson and Vahlne 2009 ).
This article intends to retrieve and explore one of those alliances forged in Europe, which had the incentive to deviate from the practices of the majority because it was a company with exclusively European partners. The article does this from the perspective of a peripheral country (Spain) in the global economy and from the special status of at least one of the partners in a monopoly. Finally, it follows case study methodology, which aims to delve into the complexity of the processes and the phenomena at hand.
1
The article responds to the need for an alternative approach to industry analysis that is particularly important for technology-based industries and the most turbulent high-tech industries; an approach focusing on complicated networks of relations and taking into account multiple possible configurations of value creation and delivery, not merely the typical supplier-customer scenario (Klincewicz 2005).
In terms of its structure, after the introduction the first section examines the creation of European Silicon Structures as a strategic alliance in the European semiconductor industry.
Sections two and three look at the case of Spain and the role of demand using the example of Telefonica. Conclusions are presented in the final section.
1 In Yin's (Yin 1993, 59 ) definition, a case study is an empirical inquiry into 'a contemporary phenomenon
A strategic alliance in the European semiconductor industry: European Silicon Structures
The case study (European Silicon Structures-ES2) emerged as an initiative formed under the umbrella of supranational institutions in order to promote the unification and harmonization of the market. In the 1980s, the European Community prepared the end of its internal trade barriers for the beginning the next decade. The region shifted in telematics from the national champions to cooperation strategy, possibly because several states simultaneously faced issues of scale. On the other hand, the stock traded by young companies, which was almost inexistent some years before, was booming.
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One important feature in Europe was the lack of an indigenous electronics industry (bait for the semiconductor industry and driver, in turn, of electronics in general) and an absence of management culture; circumstances that were compounded by a lack of correspondence between the tremendous emphasis on science and technology and production and marketing.
Politicians and European business elites looked to lasting technological innovation and risktaking in a favourable socio-economic climate as the best hopes to survive in the global competition (Forester 1989, 289) .
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The dominance of the semiconductor market by standardized products or commodity chips allowed some differentiation in speed chips and in quality control, which was a peculiarity of the Japanese. Rising R&D costs and climbing capital investments forced the firms to increase their sales to recover these costs. Despite the very low and falling marginal costs of chips and 2 (Sandholtz 1992, 20; Fortune, April 27, 1987) . Some pioneering analysts stressed European (and French) backwardness (Pouderoux 1968, 22) . 3 The Roundtable of European Industrialists think tank considered it crucial to abolish national standards opposed to free trade in the EC and the remaining telecommunications monopolies, as well as to remove all obstacles to cross-border mergers and acquisitions and to extend EC research programmes beyond the precompetitive stage (Dataquest 1991, 104) . recurrent competitive gluts in this highly cyclical industry, the omnipresence of chips in ICT compelled the large companies towards vertical integration for more powerful chips. Three relevant processes occurred here. To begin with, the restructuring of research-oriented connections in the case of Philips and Siemens and the merger between the Italian SGS with the semiconductor operations of the French Thomson. Another process was the increasing quest for government subsidies and protection and the third involved sidestepping the commodity market through the formation of a new company (Faulhaber and Tamburini 2012) .
The plans for a new European venture in the semiconductor industry were based on several assumptions about, for example, market trends and nature. In the context of a very fastgrowing full-custom CMOS circuits market, it was expected that this might more than triple in the period [1985] [1986] [1987] [1988] in Europe, reaching $1.44 billion in 1991. An increase in full-custom circuits from $120 million in 1984 to $1 billion in 1991 was possible. The new firm would try to cover no less than one-fifth of the 50 per cent for prototypes and small volume series, a market amounting to $110 million in 1991.
European customers needed professional, industrial, and specialized data-processing electronics based on circuit series preferably with reduced design and manufacturing times in order to shorten the production process. Meeting this specific need was a significant differentiation in comparison to US and Japanese companies, which were more geared towards large series. Expertise in high-tech silicon compilers would give speed of design; At the time, Europe provided around 10 per cent of the world output of semiconductors.
Several EEC efforts were engaged in increasing that share, including the peaceful Mitterrandist EUREKA project. It was one of several programmes with a high degree of risk, involving cross-country cooperation on a massive scale between firms in the early stages of the process leading from research to industrial application.
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Seven participants of the first EUREKA programme of 1985 helped establish a pan-European start-up under French initiative named European Silicon Structures, or ES2. Its objective was the production of prototypes or small batches (less than 50,000 units) of full-custom circuits.
The new firm would train the designers of client companies, assist them in their work, provide design tools, and finally offer a packaging and testing service (Forester 1989; Mytelka 1990; Sandholtz 1992 (Friend 1998, 228; Business Week, 3.108-3.121, 1989, 158) . The ES2 project was estimated at ECU 94 million; other projects include: the Philips-Siemens MEGA (the base of the controversial JESSI (Joint European Semiconductor Initiative)) at a total cost of some ECU 2,000 million; the EUROCIM project, whose cost was around ECU 30 million; and the EUROLASER project, costing around ECU 80 million (Cowhey and Aronson 1993, 157; European Commission, Press Releases, 31/10/1986, 2 Science & Technology, November 8, 1985, 40; The New York Times, October 24, 1990) . Wilmot commented in 1987: 'The day may not be far ahead when it will cost less to design a custom chip than buy a secondhand car ': Semiconductor International, 12(1-6), 1987, 76. seed capital and offered its offices in the early days, and ES2 eventually raised near to $100 million in corporate investment, venture capital, and grants (Campbell 2003) . 10 The per cent from 'institutions'. 11 Table 1 displays subsequent financial operations for several years.
hotel in Brussels and told them to get down to talking to each other. With hindsight, silicon fabrication on venture capital money was a tall order' (Campbell 2003, 59 ). Science & Technology, November 8, 1985, 40 16 (European Communities Commission 1989, 48, 207) ; (Telefónica, Memoria 1985, 6) . A decentralized structure of design centres was planned: first in Paris, Munich, and London, then, in 1986, in Milan, Stockholm, and Edinburgh (PRS Report Science & Technology, November 8 1985, 36) . Three production plants were planned in the UK, France, and Germany (Le Monde, September 4, 1985) . It is worth noting the poetic vein of the French grand press: 'Si drapeau elle a, il est bleu avec un cercle de douze étoiles d'or, l'emblème de la CEE' (Le Monde, March 28, 1987) . 17 Training was possible at the university centre close to the factory (Meister 2001, 159 Microelectronics for $5.5 million. Exel operated as a subsidiary of Exar and maintained an independent plant and R&D staff (Dataquest 1988, 209) .
PRS Report
19 PRS Report Science & Technology, Europe & Latin America, January 26, 1988, 11-12; Business International, 33, 1986, 241 . VLSI Technology Inc., a Californian firm worth $125 million and founded in 1979, specialising in complex high-performance ASICs and ASSPs, was one of ES2's main competitors. ES2 was an early buyer of the Aeble 150 machine since it bought the third machine manufactured by Perkin Elmer and installed it first at Exel in October 1986, taking on ASIC designs from April 1987, 1-338. The VLSI subsidiary, Compass Design Automation, Inc., supplied software and design libraries to the broad commercial ASIC and electronic design automation marketplaces. Grand-Clement considered that the gate array market was dominated by 'old-fashioned methodology and a clumsy, rough-and-ready approach' (Profiles: A Worldwide Survey of IC Manufacturers and Suppliers, 1998, 2-446; Electronic Engineering 60, 1988, 23) .
Thomson and SGS stressed that their moves to attack this sector resulted from their own market analyses and were under consideration well before the creation of ES2 was announced. Thomson, moving to attack this sector on the basis of its own analyses, offered
Siemens to lock the market with a joint venture to manufacture circuits on request. After the Germans' refusal, Thomson sought to enter the market with the technical support of the English and the Americans (Bonno 1986 ).
The business plan failed because the e-beam lithographic machine had a tenth of the throughput anticipated for the specifications and the advantages on prices were not met. In reality, the technically feasible and differentiating plan placed ES2 outside conventional chip manufacturing and inside a shared niche between FPGAs and the semi-custom and fullcustom markets of several firms. 21 As Saxby recognized, at the time ES2's members raised a 'truckload of money very successfully, had a fantastic idea, failed at engineering implementation, then ran out of money… and were bought by ATMEL', a Californian firm looking for a European manufacturing base converted into a worldwide leader in the design, manufacturing, and marketing of advanced semiconductors.
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government. SGS-Thomson vindicated its leadership in erasable programmable read-only memory-chip (EPROM) technology and equal financial participation from all three firms (Sandholtz 1992, 293 Europe, January 9, 2014. In 1991, leading European suppliers often concentrating on niche markets and application-specific ICs included, together with ES2: ABB-Hafo (Sweden); Austria Microsysteme (Austria); GEC Plessey Semiconductors (UK); Matra-Harris Semiconducteurs (France); Mietec (Belgium); and Telefunken (Germany). Non-European companies included, among others: AMD (USA); Analog Devices (USA); Fujitsu (Japan); Matsushita (Japan); and Mitsubishi (Japan) (Fletcher 2013, 168) . Some scholars present ES2 as an illustration of how co-investment by semiconductor-using companies can facilitate access to key components while spreading the cost (Collins and Doorley 1994, 310) . Because of the narrowness of the European market, ES2 paid a price to overcome the worst aspects of fragmentation and the high costs of coordination in the collaborative venture (Guile 1987 ).
Possibly, the main reason for the let-down was in the conception, which was a sort of trap: a niche firm had advantages for expansion but also difficulties because of the strict limits of the (Dataquest June 1988, 113) . ES2 sold off the CAD division to Cadence where O'Donnell helped integrate it.
23 Dataquest, European Semiconductor Market Share Estimates Final 1989 , 1990 ; A European Semiconductor Industry Service Report (Dataquest 1991, 6) . 24 Robin Saxby was in charge of making US2 profitable; Tim O'Donnell also joined US2 (Saxby 2012). 25 Dataquest, June 1988, 207; Business Week, 3.094-3.097, 1989, 102 . ES2 formed agreements with several European, Japanese, and North American companies, as displayed in Table 2 . 26 Moody 's OTC Industrial News Reports, 20, 1989 , 1870 Dataquest 1991, 105 . European Cad Developments was registered on January 8, 1990 in London and later dissolved. 27 Meanwhile, Solo 2000 was based on the SDA Systems family of integrated CAD tools and incorporated compiled macro blocks (Dataquest June 1988, 205) . ES2 signed contracts for SOLO l000 and SOLO 1200 software and Qudos QUICKCHIP PLUS software and arrangements for the supply to academic institutions were in hand: Journal of Semicustom ICs, 7-8, 1989, 45 . European Silicon Structures used CAD SUN 3/SOLO 1400 for the design, analysis, and simulation of an FSK technology 1.2u filter. ES2 provided goods for educational activities in Essex through the London University Consortium ( Jones and Buckley 1989, 16 29 The strategic Joint European Semiconductor Initiative (JESSI), an initiative to restore European competitiveness in microelectronics, was one of the most ambitious collaborative projects launched under EUREKA together with the German-dominated High Definition Television (Kassim and Menon, eds. 2002, 233; Marchipont 1997, 115) , considered the upstream cousin of JESSI, both involving chips (Leuenberger and Weinstein, eds. 2012, 28) . The European research programmes tried to provide central coordination for European national companies and a platform to take a more pro-active approach towards developing standards for Europe and worldwide (Dataquest's eighth annual European Semiconductor Industry Conference, Munich, 1989, 8) . Toshiba, and Intel and, in 2003, 19 th among multinational companies in terms of volume of investment in R&D) was a pioneer in the introduction of the first 32-bit microprocessor (MC68020), containing 200,000 transistors (Fletcher 2013, 129) . Its semiconductors section accounted for approximately 30 per cent of its sales; one-third of their total revenues was generated outside the US and 7.6-8.3 per cent of its revenues was allocated to R&D (Dataquest 1989, 215) . Shortly before the end of the decade of 1980, the CTNE leaned on AMPER to create the joint mobile venture Telcel Motorola (Calvo 2014, 242; Forsgren 2013, 19 1985, 85; El País, 15/10/1987 . In 1986 , IBM embarked on a decentralization process in successive steps: transfer of authority to the national subsidiaries; separating these into two groups according to a scheme of magnitude and speed of market growth (France, Italy, and Germany/rest of Europe), linked to the central offices in Paris (Thakur et al. 1997, 304 (Kabene 2010, 344) . 
Conclusion
European governments eager to promote competitive industries in their respective countries, corporate elites, and the voracity of capital joined forces in high-tech industrial projects in the framework of the creation of a single market. Without a doubt, one of the most representative cases was ES2, a panEuropean initiative in the field of microelectronics and semiconductors. Results were far from the ambitions of the initial plans, but quite possibly left traces in the configuration of differential features of the European industry with regard to the North American and the Japanese industries. In the margins of the central axis of the project, Spain played the role of secondary participant through the involvement of the CTNE, the telecommunications monopoly very soon to disappear to conform to Community rules. CTNE in general used its purchasing and investment power as a tool for industrial policy but in the case we have surveyed (European Silicon Structures), CTNE used its purchasing power as a means for a new supply source and for collective international action.
